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From stakeholder model to shareholder model 
Abstract  
The objective of this paper is to illustrate that the change in shareholders’ attitude towards firms 
(from stakeholder model to shareholder model) influences the accounting treatments of goodwill. Our 
study is based on four countries (Great Britain, the United States, Germany, and France) and covers 
more than a century, starting in 1880. We explain that all these countries have gone through four 
identified phases of goodwill accounting, classified as (1) “static” (immediate or rapid expensing), (2) 
“weakened static” (write-off against equity), (3) “dynamic” (recognition with amortization over a long 
period) and (4) “actuarial” (recognition without amortization but with impairment if necessary). We 
contribute several new features to the existing literature on goodwill: our study (1) is international and 
comparative, (2) spans more than a century, (3) uses the stakeholder/shareholder models to explain the 
evolution in goodwill treatment in the four countries studied. More precisely, it relates a balance sheet 
theory, which distinguishes four phases in accounting treatment for goodwill, to the shift from a 
stakeholder model to a shareholder model, which leads to the preference for short-term rather than 
long-term profit, (4) contributes to the debate on whether accounting rules simply reflect or arguably 
help to produce the general trend towards the shareholder model, (5) demonstrates a “one-way” 
evolution of goodwill treatment in the four countries studied, towards the actuarial phase.  
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Vers une compréhension des phases de la comptabilisation du goodwill dans quatre pays 
capitalistes occidentaux : du modèle  des « stakeholders » vers le modèle des actionnaires 
 
Résumé 
L’objectif de cet article est de montrer que le changement d’attitude des actionnaires envers les 
sociétés (d’un modèle des « stakeholders » vers un modèle des actionnaires) influence le traitement 
comptable du goodwill. Notre étude porte sur quatre pays (la Grande Bretagne, les Etats-Unis, 
l’Allemagne et la France) et couvre plus d’un siècle, à partir de 1880. Nous expliquons que tous ces 
pays ont traversé quatre phases bien identifiées dans la comptabilisation du goodwill : (1) la phase 
«  statique  » (passage en charges immédiat ou très rapide), (2) la phase «  statique édulcorée  » 
(imputation sur les capitaux propres), (3) la phase « dynamique » (reconnaissance et amortissement 
sur une longe période) et (4) la phase « actuarielle » (reconnaissance sans amortissement mais avec un 
test de perte de valeur). Notre étude contribue à la littérature existante de plusieurs manières : (1) elle 
est internationale et comparative ; (2) elle porte sur plus d’un siècle ; (3) elle utilise les modèles des 
« stakeholders »/actionnaires pour expliquer l’évolution de la comptabilisation du goodwill dans les 
quatre pays étudiés. Plus précisément, elle relie une théorie du bilan, qui distingue quatre phases dans 
le traitement comptable du goodwill, à une évolution du modèle des « stakeholders » vers un modèle 
des actionnaires, ce qui conduit à une préférence pour des profits à court terme ; (4) elle contribue au 
débat selon lequel les règles comptables reflètent simplement le modèle des actionnaires ou au 
contraire permettent de le mettre en place  ; (5) elle démontre l’existence d’une évolution «  uni-
directionnelle  » de la comptabilisation du goodwill dans les quatre pays étudiés vers la phase 
actuarielle. 
Key words 
Goodwill – Histoire comptable – Nature sociale de la comptabilité – Modèles des 
« Stakeholders »/actionnaires – Gouvernance – Allemagne – Etats-Unis – France – Grande Bretagne 
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In positive accounting literature, the “stakeholder model” and “shareholder model” 
concepts have been emphasized (Ball, Kothari & Robin, 2000, p. 243) to explain certain 
properties of accounting earnings (timeliness, conservatism). The stakeholder model (usually 
related to code-law countries) is a highly concentrated shareholding model where 
shareholders are mainly the founder families, the state, the bank or even trade unions and are 
actively involved in management of the company. The shareholder model (usually related to 
common-law countries) is not used as a legal term, but refers to a specific corporate 
governance model where ownership is dispersed and shareholders are separate from 
management. This literature offers us an interesting framework for analysing how the changes 
in actors’ forms of calculation impact accounting regulations (Robson, 1993). 
Taking the accounting treatment for goodwill as an emblematic illustration, this article sets 
out to show that the direct associations between the stakeholder model and code-law 
countries, on the one hand, and between the shareholder model and common-law countries, 
on the other hand, are open to debate. Based on a social and historical study of four countries 
which have played a major role in the Western world economy during the 20
th century, Great 
Britain, the United States, Germany and France, we show that rather than corresponding to a 
clear dichotomy between common-law and code-law countries, these two models of corporate 
governance relate to a gradual shift: the stakeholder model was present in all four countries, 
and has evolved over time into the shareholder model. More precisely, we demonstrate that 
the four countries studied have a common starting point (stakeholder model), a time when 
shareholders were mainly insiders actively involved in management; and from that point, due 
to the capital markets’ current importance, all of them have made their way to the common 
destination of professionalization of management and investors (shareholder model), but by 
different routes and at different paces. 
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centuries” and cited a reference from the year 1571. Without looking so far back, our study 
still covers a period of more than a century, starting from the 1880s. Hughes (1982, p. 24) 
tells us that “accounting literature on goodwill appeared in … periodicals or newspapers, such 
as The Accountant [which] started in 1874”.  
Our paper concentrates on “acquired goodwill”: acquired either individually (goodwill 
purchased when buying assets other than by buying shares in a company [non-consolidation 
goodwill]) or in a business combination (goodwill purchased by a group when buying shares 
in a company [consolidation goodwill]) (Nobes & Norton, 1996, p. 180). Internally-generated 
goodwill is not covered, as it involves specific issues in addition to those relating to acquired 
goodwill (see Jennings & Thompson, 1996).  
Many articles observe a wide diversity in both the regulations and treatments applied in 
practice to goodwill (Catlett & Olson, 1968; Hughes, 1982; Arnold et al., 1994). In the United 
States, Walker (1938a) provides tables showing prevailing practices and the diversity in the 
treatment of goodwill in the balance sheet.  
It is always difficult to divide prevailing accounting treatment into clearly dated phases. For 
this study, we decided to take a time of fundamental change as the start of a phase. That 
change generally concerns accounting regulations: newly-issued standards or exposure drafts 
that would later lead to the final standard constitute our primary sources. However, for the 
early stages (late 19
th century and early 20
th century) before formal accounting regulation of 
goodwill, our sources are court rulings and discussion papers written by leading scholars of 
the period (“doctrine”). We determine the phases on the basis of these elements. 
In this article, we relate the stakeholder/shareholder models to a “balance sheet theory”, 
developed by continental European scholars such as Schmalenbach (1908) with his concept of 
the “dynamic (versus static) balance sheet”. We extend these concepts to identify four phases 
in accounting treatment for goodwill. All the countries examined went through an initial 
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“end” of the firm, with items measured on the basis of liquidation value. This phase is marked 
by great reluctance to see goodwill as a true asset. In principle, this “unsightly, unwieldy and 
‘un-valuable’ asset”, to borrow Dicksee’s expression (1897, p. 47), was to be expensed 
immediately or at least rapidly. In the second phase, which we call “weakened static”, 
goodwill was made to disappear within a short time of acquisition, but by means of a write-
off against equity. The third phase, called “dynamic”, as it refers to the going concern 
(dynamic) assumption, saw widespread amortization of goodwill over a relatively long period. 
Finally, during the fourth, “actuarial” phase, goodwill came to be recognized as an asset, with 
no systematic reduction of value. 
Both individual corporate accounts and consolidated accounts are considered. This study 
expands on previous literature on goodwill in five ways. First, it takes an international, 
comparative approach, focusing as it does on four countries. Second, it spans more than a 
century, starting in 1880. Third, it uses the stakeholder/shareholder models to explain the 
evolution in goodwill treatment in the four countries studied. More precisely, it relates a 
balance sheet theory, which distinguishes four phases in accounting treatment for goodwill, to 
the shift from a stakeholder model to a shareholder model. The result of this general trend is 
the preference for short-term rather than long-term profit. This idea is consistent with the 
works of economists (Lazonick & O'Sullivan, 2000) who show that in the US, companies 
have gone from a “retain-and-reinvest” attitude (preferring immediate expenses to favour 
long-term profit) to a short-term profit orientation with distribution of dividends, explaining 
the move from a static phase to a dynamic and actuarial approach. Fourth, the article 
contributes to the debate about whether accounting rules simply reflect or arguably help to 
produce the general trend towards the shareholder model. Finally, we demonstrate a “one-
way” evolution of goodwill treatment in the four countries studied, towards the actuarial 
phase.  
  4The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The first section describes the existing 
literature on accounting regulation and the social nature of accounting which serves as the 
theoretical basis of our analysis. The second section is dedicated to the 
stakeholder/shareholder models and their relationship with the balance sheet theory referred to 
earlier. This conceptual framework is applied to the four phases of accounting treatment for 
goodwill. The third section examines these four historical phases of accounting for goodwill 
in four countries, and explains their successive development. This is followed by a discussion 
section and a final section concluding the article.  
1.  Accounting regulation and the social nature of accounting 
1.1. Theories explaining accounting regulation 
For decades, accounting regulation has been arousing interest among researchers. Booth 
and Cocks (1990, p. 511) examine accounting standard-setting and note that its study has been 
pursued from the perspective of five general research traditions: professional logic, neo-
classical economics, cognitive psychology, the market for excuses and political lobbying. 
Lobbying has been extensively invoked in explaining standard-setting (Sutton, 1984; Tutticci, 
Dunstan & Holmes, 1994; Weetman, Davie & Collins, 1996; Van Lent, 1997; McLeay, 
Ordelheide & Young, 2000; Zeff, 2002). The concept of “interest groups” has also been 
developed (Walker, 1987) and enriched (Robson, 1993). Conflicting agendas (Walker & 
Robinson, 1994a) or inter-organizational conflict (Walker & Robinson, 1994b) may also 
explain standard-setting. Booth and Cocks propose a power analysis (1990, p. 524).  
Nobes (1992), setting out to explain the history of goodwill in the UK, proposes a cyclical 
model of standard-setting as a political process influenced by six parties: corporate managers, 
auditors, users, government, international opinion and upward force. Bryer (1995) develops 
another theory to explain standard SSAP 22 (ASC, 1984) on accounting for goodwill: he 
employs concepts from Marx’s political economy. 
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emphasize the role of power in the development of an R&D standard; Laughlin and Puxty 
(1983) analyse the political process of standard-setting in the light of the problem of the 
conceptual framework and its viability; Power (1992) discusses brand accounting in the 
United Kingdom; Willmott et al. (1992) theorize the process of accounting regulation and the 
processes of social and political regulation generally, taking accounting for R&D in four 
advanced capitalist countries as an example; Fogarty, Hussein and Ketz (1994), in the US, 
develop an approach based on power, ideology and rhetoric; Klumpes (1994) analyzes the 
politics of rule development in the case of Australian pension fund accounting rule-making. 
Walker and Robinson (1993) review this literature. Harrison and McKinnon (1986) use 
change analysis to reveal the attributes and essential properties of regulation in a specific 
nation. 
The political and economic consequences of accounting have also come under 
consideration (Solomons, 1978, p. 68; Zeff, 1978, p. 60; Solomons, 1983). 
1.2. Social nature of accounting  
It was several decades ago that accounting ceased to be considered as a pure technique and 
came to be seen as an instrument for social management and change (Hopwood, 1976, 
Preface; Burchell et al., 1980; Puxty, Willmott, Cooper & Lowe, 1987), i.e. a “social rather 
than a purely technical phenomenon” (Burchell, Clubb & Hopwood, 1985, p. 381). Hopwood 
(1976, p. 1), for example, says “the purposes, processes and techniques of accounting, its 
human, organizational and social roles, and the way in which the resulting information is used 
have never been static. (…) They have evolved, and continue to evolve, in relation to changes 
in the economic, social, technological and political environments of organizations”.  
Harrison and McKinnon (1986, p. 233) point out that “since the early 1970s, policy 
formulation has been viewed as a social process; i.e. as the outcome of complex interactions 
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Zimmerman (1978), Holthausen & Leftwich (1983) and Kelly (1983). In their work on value 
added in the United Kingdom, Burchell et al. (1985) review some existing theories of the 
social nature of accounting and conduct a social analysis. In the same vein, for Burchell et al. 
(1980), “accounting change increasingly emanates from the interplay between a series of 
institutions which claim a broader social significance”. Taking a different approach (based on 
Historical Materialism), Tinker et al. (1982) also argue that accounting is not neutral and that 
accountants “have been unduly influenced by one particular viewpoint on economic thought 
(utility based, marginalist economics) with the result that accounting serves to bolster 
particular interest groups in society” (p. 167). 
As Burchell et al. say (1985, p. 381), “although the relationship between accounting and 
society has been posited frequently, it has been subjected to little systematic analysis”. We 
believe there is still some room for further contributions in this field. In this study, using 
goodwill as an example, we try to illustrate how the rise of the shareholder model has 
influenced accounting treatment. 
This entire stream of literature emphasizes the influence of the social context on 
accounting. However, there could be a reverse effect: an influence exerted by accounting on 
the general economy and social trends. The work by Burchell et al. (1985, p. 381) already 
quoted above also demonstrates that “accounting, in turn, also has come to be more actively 
and explicitly recognised as an instrument for social management and change” (p. 381). One 
of their contributions is to highlight the intermingling of accounting and the social (p. 382). 
Tinker et al. (1982) also mention this interrelation, although more briefly, in stating that 
accountants bear a responsibility “for shaping subjective expectations which, in turn, affect 
decisions [our emphasis] about resource allocation, and the distribution of income between 
and within social classes” (p. 188).  
  7While Willmott et al. (1992)’s analysis concentrated on accounting, social and political 
regulations, taking accounting for R&D as an example, we will focus on accounting treatment 
and regulations on goodwill. We will also attempt to build on Burchell et al.’s work (1985) by 
showing the reverse influence of accounting on the social where goodwill is concerned. 
2.  Conceptual framework of analysis: stakeholder/shareholder models, balance sheet 
theory and goodwill  
Our framework of analysis is based on the stakeholder/shareholder models, which are 
associated with the balance sheet theory as applied to the accounting treatment for goodwill. 
2.1 Stakeholder/shareholder models 
In this article, we enter the stakeholders vs. shareholders debate (see, e.g., Driver & 
Thomson, 2002), taking the view that the evolution in regulations governing treatment of 
goodwill can be explained by the rise of the shareholder model and “constellations of material 
and ideological forces that are present within different nations” (Puxty, Willmott, Cooper & 
Lowe, 1987).  
The origin of this dichotomy theory can be traced back to the debate between Berle and 
Dodd on corporate accountability (Macintosh, 1999). During the 1930s, Berle and Dodd, two 
American law professors, publicly debated the question “to whom are corporations 
accountable?” (Berle, 1932; Dodd, 1932). Berle’s opinion was that the management of a 
corporation could only be held accountable to shareholders for their actions. Dodd believed 
that corporations were accountable to both their shareholders and the society in which they 
operated. Macintosh (1999) suggests that this debate “recognized in the absence of effective 
stockholder control, that full disclosure of information was the only effective means of 
ensuring that management would act in the interests of shareholders”. Furthermore, the views 
reiterated by Berle with Means, an economist, in The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property (Berle & Means, 1932) are often considered as the beginnings of awareness of the 
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of separation of ownership and control (Baums, Buxbaum & Hopt, 1994, Preface). 
In a more recent phenomenon, researchers started to take an interest in the differences of 
ownership structure, and therefore corporate governance, between different countries (see, 
e.g., Roe, 1994 for a comparison between the USA, Germany and Japan). 
These normative analyses on international differences in corporate ownership were then 
validated by empirical evidence from a study by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 
(1999). Analysing the ownership structures of the 20 largest publicly traded firms in each of 
the 27 richest economies, they find that the United States combines relatively high ownership 
dispersion with good shareholder protection, a situation shared with other rich common-law 
countries, while in other countries, the firms studied are typically controlled by families or the 
State. 
Based on this law and finance literature, the dichotomy between stakeholder and 
shareholder models is often viewed by positive accounting researchers as a clear-cut 
distinction between Anglo-American (common-law countries) and Continental European 
(code-law countries) business environments, and used to show the superiority of the 
American accounting model over those in other countries, and argue that capital-market 
driven full disclosure is the only worthwhile development model for accounting regulators in 
other countries (Ball, Kothari & Robin, 2000; Hung, 2001; Hope, 2003). 
Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000) were among the pioneers of this dichotomy between 
stakeholder and shareholder models in the empirical accounting literature. They refer to “the 
extent of political influence on accounting”, and then go on to say (2000, p. 3): “In code-law 
countries, the comparatively strong political influence on accounting occurs at national and 
firm levels. Governments establish and enforce national accounting standards, typically with 
representation from major political groups such as labour unions, banks and business 
associations. At the firm level, politicization typically leads to a ‘stakeholder’ governance 
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‘shareholder’ governance model that is typical of common-law countries, shareholders alone 
elect members of the governing board, [and] payouts are less closely linked to current-period 
accounting income”.  
We believe this theoretical framework offers a valuable basis for analyzing the change in 
shareholders’ attitude toward firms. But we argue that at least two important dimensions are 
lacking in the extant debate. For one thing, there is no such clear-cut distinction in governance 
models between Anglo-American and Continental European business environments. Instead, 
in each country, we observe a shift, albeit at varying paces, from the stakeholder model to the 
shareholder model. This evolution is confirmed for Germany by Schilling (2001, p. 150) who 
mentions that “shareholders’ interests play a much major role” and by Stoney and Winstanley 
(2001, p. 618) who observe that this country is “moving towards a more market-based (…) 
approach”. Our analysis should be seen as part of a debate which has generated mixed, not to 
say contradictory, results. While Letza, Sun and Kirkbride (2004, p. 252) advocate a 
paradigmatic shift from the shareholder model to the stakeholder model, Beaver (1999) 
questions the validity of the stakeholder model. In between, there is a developing body of 
literature bringing out the idea of a possible convergence between the two models to form a 
“hybrid” model (Jeffers, 2005; Ponssard, Plihon & Zarlowski, 2005).  
Even the literature referred to above (Ball, Kothari & Robin, 2000; Ball, Robin & Wu, 
2003; Ball & Shivakumar, 2005), which clearly separates the two models between common-
law and code-law countries, includes some arguments supporting observation of a general 
move towards a shareholder model. In this stream of literature, the shareholder model is 
associated with a high level of conservatism proxied as a high sensitivity of earnings to any 
negative return on the firm’s share price. In various countries, time-series empirical evidence 
proves that this sensitivity is on an upward trend. For example, Basu (1997) documents a 
steady increase over the thirty years between the 1960s and 1990s in the sensitivity of 
  10earnings to negative returns in the US. This evidence confirms that even in the US, the move 
towards a shareholder model has been a gradual process. In countries considered as 
stakeholder-dominated, empirical evidence also confirms an increase in this sensitivity. Ball 
et al. (2000) report that it increased significantly in France and Germany in the period 1990-
1995. Giner & Rees (2001) suggest that the phenomenon, known as asymmetric 
conservatism, continued to increase during the period 1996-98 in France, Germany and the 
UK. Basu (2001) uses the development of capital markets in Europe to explain this 
phenomenon. All this evidence indicates that the distinction between the stakeholder model 
and shareholder model is not so clear-cut after all, and the development of the shareholder 
model is closely tied up with the increasingly important role of the capital markets. 
The other neglected aspect in our opinion, rather than seeking to validate or invalidate the 
superiority of the American accounting model (serving the interests of the shareholder 
model), is that the major difference between the stakeholder and shareholder models is the 
attitude towards long-term/short-term profit. As the extant literature shows,  the stakeholder 
and shareholder models diverge on three major points: ownership structure, information 
asymmetry and the role of capital markets. The differences between the two governance 
models in all these three areas produce a preference for long-term profit in the stakeholder 
model but for short-term profit in the shareholder model, as we demonstrate below.  
In practice, the stakeholder and shareholder models reflect two different types of 
relationship between shareholders and firms. In the former, ownership is often highly 
concentrated, with shareholders being mainly the founder families, the state, the bank or even 
trade unions, and actively involved in management of the company. There is less of an 
information asymmetry problem for these stakeholders: they can relatively reliably assess the 
company’s future prospects. The shares of such a company are generally not very liquid and it 
is not easy to transfer ownership. The shareholders are therefore concerned with long-term 
financial viability and economic performance. Long-term contractual associations between 
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(Letza, Sun & Kirkbride, 2004, p. 243). In the shareholder model, ownership is dispersed and 
shareholders are separate from the firm’s management team, with the result that owners of the 
company often have very weak or no involvement in corporate decision making. Besides, the 
sizeable physical and mental distance between the management team and shareholders 
considerably increases the level of information asymmetry. The capital market regulations 
(e.g. on anti-insider trading) limit their information access to publicly available information 
only. The shareholders have less visibility over the firm’s future, and are thus more focused 
on its (short-term) financial performance. Furthermore, the shareholder model is closely 
associated with a highly developed (and therefore very liquid) capital market. In such a 
context, it is simple for shareholders to transfer their shareholding to somebody else, and this 
accentuates their short-term relationship with their invested companies. This situation is 
confirmed,  a contrario, by certain authors who assert that the solution for improving 
corporate governance is “to provide an environment in which shareholders (particularly large 
and/or institutional shareholders) and managers are encouraged to share long-run performance 
horizons” (Letza, Sun & Kirkbride, 2004, p. 245). 
The long-term/short-term objectives divide is not new. The same authors remind their 
readers that the 19
th century debate on corporate governance involved two major theories: the 
“inherent property rights theory” (also called the “fiction theory”), which favoured profit 
maximization, and the “social entity theory” (also called the “organic theory”) which put 
more emphasis on long-term growth (Letza, Sun & Kirkbride, 2004, p. 248). 
We observe that the role managers play has changed dramatically in the last hundred years. 
In the late 19
th and early 20
th centuries, most managers were the owners of their companies 
(stakeholder model). It was thus in their interest to preserve the company’s long-term 
existence, and this was also in the interest of the creditors. But in most major companies 
  12nowadays, managers are employees like any others. With their stock option plans and other 
incentives, they act more like short-term investors (shareholder model). 
We believe that the shift from the stakeholder model to the shareholder model is compatible 
with the “business systems” literature and the “comparative-business-systems approach” 
(Whitley, 1998, 1999a, 1999b). Business systems are conceived as distinctive patterns of 
economic organization that vary in their degree and mode of authoritative coordination of 
economic activities, and in the organization of, and interconnections between, owners, 
managers, experts, and other employees (Whitley, 1999b, p. 33). Nation states often develop 
distinctive business systems and Whitley discusses the importance of state boundaries (1999b, 
p. 44-45). However, while business systems are related to countries, they evolve over time, 
and Whitley (1999b, p. 182-208) provides evidence of changes in business systems in East 
Asian capitalist countries (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan). A few years later, Whitley (2005, p. 
223) adds another idea: “the growing internationalization of investment and managerial 
coordination may weaken the national specificity of business systems”. All these arguments, 
based on the changes in dominant forms of economic organizations in market economies, can 
be transposed to the countries included in our scope. Although Whitley (2005, p. 223) limits 
his thought by referring to the “weakly institutionalized nature of the international business 
environment at the global level”, we will demonstrate in section 3 that as far as financial 
accounting is concerned, the international environment has had a major influence on 
accounting for goodwill. In conclusion, the concept of change in business systems reinforces 
the idea of evolution from one corporate governance model (the stakeholder model, in our 
study) to another (the shareholder model).  
2.2 Balance sheet theory and goodwill 
Continental European balance sheet theories first appeared in the 19
th century, in a context 
marked by a clash of interests between creditors and shareholders. From the introduction of 
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the code (e.g., Delaporte, 1808, p. 122; Molinier, 1846, p. 194) until around 1870-1890, 
creditors and their defenders in France and Germany successfully imposed the “liquidation 
market value” as the basis for accounting legislation and court rulings (Richard, 2005a, 
2005c). But towards 1870 in Germany, certain lawyers defending the interests of shareholders 
in large companies, particularly railway companies, led a revolt against the accounting 
concept of the Vermögensbilanz, or “liquidation balance sheet”. Based on the going concern 
concept, they proposed a new type of balance sheet, the Betriebsbilanz or “going concern 
balance sheet” considered more capable of generating regular dividend distribution, where 
fixed assets were stated at (amortized) cost (Richard, 2005a, 2005c). Von Strombeck (1878, p. 
15), for example, argued that “the distribution of dividends should be based solely on going 
concern balance sheets, not liquidation balance sheets, so as to avoid fluctuations in value”. 
A few years later, although he was also against liquidation balance sheets and in favour of 
the going concern principle, another German lawyer, Simon (1886, p. 161), published what 
amounts to a work of accounting theory with a new concept of the balance sheet, based on 
statement of fixed assets at their subjective value in use (Gebrauchswert) for a given 
businessman, rather than at cost as Von Strombeck recommended. 
It can thus be considered that the three-faceted continental European balance sheet theories 
and the conflicting concepts of the balance sheet (liquidation value, cost “value” and value in 
use) emerged as early as 1886 (Richard, 2005b). This theoretical framework was then 
advanced in Germany by Schmalenbach (1919), who introduced a new vocabulary, 
classifying the at-cost balance sheet as “dynamic”, as opposed to “static” liquidation value or 
value in use balance sheets. 
This two-way classification and vocabulary are still in use in Germany, particularly in the 
work of Moxter (1984). In this paper, we use the representation by Richard (1996), who opts 
for a three-way classification: the word “static” is reserved for liquidation value balance 
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sheets, are given a specific adjective, “actuarial”.  
Continental European balance sheet theories were an important source of inspiration for 
Hatfield, the first great American accounting theorist, who was well-versed in German culture 
(Zeff, 2000; Richard, 2005b). Afterwards, with the coming of Paton’s era (Paton & 
Stevenson, 1922; Paton & Littleton, 1940; Paton, 1962), “Anglo-Saxon” authors lost sight of 
these theories. But for the purpose of this article, they are particularly interesting, since due to 
their historical origins (the creditor-shareholder conflict) they provide a systematic link 
between the typology and conception of balance sheets and the evolution of the sociological 
and political context, and relate to the stakeholder/shareholder question that is the backdrop to 
this study. 
Figure 1 summarises the different balance sheet concepts, highlighting the terminology 
used by the different authors. 
Insert figure 1 about here 
Schematically, the history of goodwill since the 1880s can be divided into four phases 
using a typology inspired by the continental European balance sheet theories discussed above 
(Richard, 2005b):  
(1)  The pure static phase (n) (Richard, 1996, p. 31, 33): The term static (from Latin “stare”, 
to stop) is used to describe an accounting theory which assumes that the balance sheet, for 
the sake of creditor protection, shows liquidation values (the resale value in a liquidation 
process). It implies that goodwill is a fictitious asset, and applies immediate expensing or 
rapid amortization (over 5 years).  
(2)  The weakened static phase (o): this is an adjusted form of non-recognition of goodwill, 
applying a write-off against equity. 
(3)  The dynamic phase (p) (Richard, 1996, p. 51, 61-62). Here, the underlying assumption is 
no longer the liquidation of the company but the going concern (dynamic) approach, 
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asset, with application of amortization over a long period. 
(4)  The actuarial phase (q): this corresponds to the going concern assumption but without 
the idea that goodwill can “die”, leading to recognition of an asset, with impairment 
testing based on discounted (actuarial) cash flows
1.  
2.3 Stakeholder/shareholder models applied to goodwill 
2.3.1. Stakeholder model 
In a stakeholder model, shareholders are mainly blockholders such as families, state, banks 
or trade unions. Their presence is often a long-term commitment, and exits are relatively rare. 
In this situation, their main concern is protection and the durability of the corporate assets, in 
line with creditors of the firm. They are not therefore in favour of recording goodwill as an 
asset, preferring to have it eliminated as soon as possible (phase n of the balance sheet 
theory). Walker sums up their position very succinctly (1938a, p. 174).  
The creditors, particularly banks, were sufficiently influential in the past to impose the 
write-off against equity solution (phase o). The opinion of some actors in the early part of the 
20
th century was expressed by McKinsey and Meech (1923, p. 538): “Bankers and 
businessmen generally prefer a balance sheet presenting only tangible assets to one loaded 
with goodwill and other intangible values … in general, accumulated surplus should bear its 
share”. This opinion was echoed by Esquerré (1927, p. 41). 
2.3.2 Shareholder model 
The situation in the shareholder model is quite different. “Professional” shareholders or 
“rentier investors” (to use an expression of Hannah, 1983, p. 57), unlike family-owner 
                                                 
1 We associate discounted cash flows with the term “actuarial” in the same way as Bogle (1889, p. 693) and 
Guthrie (1883, p. 6). 
  16shareholders, are generally short-term oriented and expect immediate, maximum profits. 
Many accounting historians have shown how, very often, creditors and family-owners share 
an interest in conservative accounting (see notably Edwards, 1989; Lemarchand, 1993, p. 
529-581). The difference between the interests of professional shareholders and other 
stakeholders goes a long way back, as exemplified by Best’s (1885) remark: “shareholders are 
very apt to take one point of view and creditors and the outside public another”. In theory, the 
disappearance of the old conservative attitude towards goodwill should be associated with a 
rise in the influence of professional shareholders.  
Total separation between ownership and management tends to work in favour of a non-
amortization approach (phase q), after the amortization approach (phase p), which could be 
seen as a compromise. More prosaically, it could be said that shareholders will not stand for 
immediate or rapid charging of goodwill against income. At the end of the 19
th century, a 
good many authors, including supporters of immediate expensing/amortization, were already 
aware that shareholders could find themselves deprived of dividends due to drastic 
amortization of goodwill (see Matheson, 1884; More, 1891, p. 287; Guthrie, 1898, p. 429; 
Leake, 1914, p. 88).  
Much more recently, the FASB itself (2001b, p. 3) acknowledged that “analysts and other 
users of financial statements, as well as company managements, noted that intangible assets 
are an increasingly important economic resource for many entities (…) and that financial 
statement users also indicated that they did not regard goodwill amortization expense as being 
useful information in analysing investments”. It went on (2001b, p. 5) to reiterate the 
importance of “financial statement users”, saying they “will be better able to understand the 
investments made in those [goodwill and intangible] assets and the subsequent performance 
of those investments” (our emphasis). The accent is explicitly on performance measurement, 
and “ability to assess future profitability and cash flows” (FASB, 2001b, p. 5).  
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which concludes that “amortization of goodwill was not consistent with the concept of 
representational faithfulness, as discussed in FASB Concepts Statement No. 2” (FASB, 
1980). It may sound surprising that it took more than 20 years to realize this inconsistency, 
but the FASB does explicitly link the reform to “the increase in merger and acquisition 
activity that brought greater attention to the fact that two transactions that are economically 
similar may be accounted for by different methods that produce dramatically different 
financial statement results” [the pooling-of-interests method and purchase method] (FASB, 
2001b, Appendix 1, p. 5).  
In our opinion, the capital markets’ influence, and therefore the importance of the 
shareholder model, is also reflected in the notion of international pressure, or the desire for 
international comparability which is sometimes mentioned (Bryer, 1995, p. 305). The 
growing role of the capital markets is also due to the ever-increasing significance of goodwill 
in corporate accounts (Higson, 1998). 
Figure 2 below summarizes the results of our analysis on the relationship between the shift 
from a stakeholder model to a shareholder model and accounting regulations for goodwill. 
Insert figure 2 about here 
Figure 2 shows that the shift from the stakeholder model to a shareholder model (from 
long-term to short-term profit orientation) is progressive, and corresponds to the four phases 
of the balance sheet theory described above which, in turn, can be related to goodwill 
treatment. 
3.  The four historical phases of accounting for goodwill 
The move from the stakeholder model to the shareholder model resulted in changes in the 
regulations affecting goodwill treatment over the period examined. However, the four 
countries studied went through the same phases but at different times.  
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the four countries studied. 
Insert figure 3 about here 
We do not include the IASC/IASB as a separate entity in our detailed analysis as the 
influence of its standard-setting on other countries has only been seen recently, i.e. in the late 
nineties with the trend for reducing the number of options (Walton, Haller & Raffournier, 
2003, p. 13)
2.  
3.1. Phase 1: The static phase (non-recognition phase) 
3.1.1. Great Britain (1880 - 1897) 
As emphasized by Dicksee and Tillyard (1920, p. 70), right up until 1900 the law and court 
rulings played a practically non-existent role in the treatment of goodwill in Great Britain. It 
is thus important to find out what practices most British accountants recommended.  
In this phase, running from 1880 to about 1900, the dominant doctrine considered that 
goodwill was not a true asset, and should be immediately, or at least rapidly, expensed. The 
best proof of the widespread refusal to consider goodwill as an asset is in the writings of 
Gundry, one of the few authors in favour of seeing it as a “valuable asset” (1902, p. 663). 
Gundry, quoting Dicksee (1897) complains of “the general denouncement and deprecation of 
the term as an asset” (1902, p. 663).  
The argument that goodwill would have no value in a bankruptcy situation was taken up by 
lawyers, such as Roby (1892, p. 293) and some accountants, including Knox (in Guthrie, 
                                                 
2 For the sake of completeness, we will simply observe that the international accounting standard “Accounting 
for business combinations” (IASC, 1983) was adopted for the first time in 1983. Under paragraphs 39-42, 
several options were possible: (1) recognition as an asset and amortization over the useful life; (2) immediate 
reduction of earnings or (3) write-off against equity. These solutions correspond to our first three phases (static, 
weakened static and dynamic). This standard was revised in 1993, and the first two options were removed: 
goodwill had to be amortized over its useful life. This useful life was not to exceed five years unless a longer 
period, not exceeding twenty years, could be justified (IASC, 1993, § 40, 42). Only IFRS 3 (IASB, 2004b), 
which is mentioned in the body of the article, had any real influence on three of our studied countries (i.e. Great 
Britain, France and Germany). 
  191898, p. 430), Stacey (1888, p. 605) and the author of a leading article in Time in 1905 
(quoted by Dicksee & Tillyard, 1920, p. 99). It is thus hardly surprising that a large number of 
accountants were in favour of immediately or rapidly writing off goodwill against profits 
(Matheson, 1884; Bourne, 1888, p. 604; More, 1891, p. 286; Roby, 1892, p. 293; see also 
Knox in Guthrie, 1898, p. 430).  
Our conclusion from all this information is that the immediate expensing or rapid 
amortization approach, against current profits, was the standard practice up until 1900-1905. 
Globally speaking, this prudent accounting approach comes as no surprise: it is in line with 
the social and economic context of the period (Parker, 1965, p. 160; Hoppit, 1987, p. 16) 
where the stakeholder model was clearly the norm for corporate governance.  
In contrast to the German situation (see below), there was strong opposition in Great 
Britain to the dominant purely static doctrine, ranging over several distinct views. For 
simplicity’s sake, we identify the two main views. 
The first, more widely-held view concerned proponents of the dynamic approach (which 
corresponds to our phase p) (see Guthrie, 1898, p. 429). The second, and at the time the only 
credible alternative to the purely static approach, rallied authors who (also) proposed that 
goodwill should disappear from the accounts immediately, but by charging to equity (phase 
o). This was the position of writers such as Dicksee (1897), whose later influence was to be 
fundamental (see below). 
3.1.2. United States (1880 - 1897) 
Throughout this period, the US economy was also dominated by the stakeholder model. 
Goodwill was not therefore considered as a true asset and was theoretically to be deducted 
from revenues. There was no regulation during this phase, but British writings and practices 
were very influential (Hughes, 1982, p. 24), and the situation appears to have been the same 
as in Great Britain. Symptomatically, the authors of one study of changes in the treatment of 
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th 
century, “accountants appeared in substantial agreement that amounts expended for goodwill 
should not be carried very long in the balance sheet” (Catlett & Olson, 1968, p. 38). 
Knight (1908, p. 197) speaks of goodwill as an “uncertain value” and deems that “the best 
course is to dispose of such an account through a charge to depreciation”, with writing off 
“encouraged”.  
3.1.3. Germany (1880 - 1985) 
Germany
3 was the country with by far the longest initial phase: from 1880 to 1985. Prior to 
1931, no law made any reference to treatment of goodwill, leaving only doctrine and court 
rulings as our sources. The German lawmakers of the time, under the influence of Napoleonic 
lawyers, adopted a static view of accounting: no item could be recognized as an asset unless it 
would have an individual market value in the event the company ceased to exist, i.e. went 
bankrupt. As a result of this doctrine most intangibles, particularly goodwill, that were not 
separable from the company and had no individual market value, had to be expensed 
immediately. This was to be the dominant practice for a great many years.  
The only major voices raised in favour of recognizing acquired goodwill came from early 
supporters of the dynamic doctrine such as Simon and Fischer (Greve, 1933, p. 22). Only a 
few authors dared to propose recognition of goodwill followed by amortization over more 
than five years (Take, 1939, p. 116). Among the main proponents of this approach were 
Schmalenbach (1949), Müller (1915), Schreier (1928), Stern (1907), and Schmidt (1927) (on 
these authors, see Greve, 1933, p. 32; Take, 1939, p. 111-112), all of whom were in favour of 
long-term, systematic amortization. 
                                                 
3 Although the country “Germany” did not exist as such at the beginning of the period under study, the following 
discussions apply to Prussia and the other German states, because after the Nürnberg conference (1857), a 
commercial code common to all German states (“Allgemeines Deutsches Handelsgesetzbuch” - ADHGB) was 
established as early as 1861 (Oberbrinkmann, 1990, p. 33). 
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added a new article to the Commercial Code (article 261) allowing acquired goodwill to be 
recognized as such only on condition it was then amortized by “appropriate annual 
amortization charges”. According to Greve (1933, p. 35) and Take (1939, p. 116), this law 
simply gave formal expression to the dominant doctrine of the time. 
The measures introduced in 1931 were included without amendment in the law (AktG) of 
1937 (article 133, paragraph 5), and then almost without amendment in the law (AktG) of 
1965 (article 153, paragraph 5). The only noteworthy difference is that in 1965, the law 
stipulated that the systematic amortization against goodwill entered as an asset must be at 
least one-fifth annually. This remained applicable until 1985. 
This exceptionally long static phase in Germany is consistent with the country’s strong 
stakeholder model. For example, Roe (1994, p. 1936) documented that “CEOs at many large 
German companies face a small group of institutional voting blocks that controls nearly half 
of the stock voted”. 
3.1.4. France: the static phase (1880 - 1917) 
Reflecting the decisive influence of family owners and creditors (stakeholder model), the 
first phase in France was dominated by the purely static approach in both doctrine and case 
law: goodwill was not considered a true asset and was to be expensed immediately, or at the 
very least amortized rapidly. 
In the 1880s, authors such as Didier (1885) with his “strict” balance sheet, Courcelle-
Seneueil (1872) and Vavasseur (1868), who stressed the difficulty of realizing fixed assets (in 
Verley, 1906, p. 121), recommended that assets, including goodwill, should be carried at 
liquidation value. To this way of thinking, a “good” asset was one with totally amortized 
goodwill. 
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and Amiaud (1920, p. 6) also insisted that acquired goodwill was not a real asset. While they 
accepted recognition of this “fictitious” asset, rapid amortization (generally total amortization 
within less than five years) or a similar solution was required. 
The dynamic approach of long-term amortization was only supported by Magnin (1912), 
whose writings, inspired by the German dynamic school, were fiercely criticized by most 
other authors. The only other real resistance to the static view came from French followers of 
the famous German lawyer Simon, principally Duplessis (1903) and above all Charpentier 
(1906), who were in favour of goodwill remaining in the balance sheet at its acquisition value, 
unless a fall in its “useful” value could be proved. This is in effect a conservative version of 
the actuarial approach. 
3.2. Phase 2: the weakened static phase (excluding France) 
This phase is identifiable in all the countries except France. Unlike the other countries 
where accounting law is independent of tax law, from 1917 the situation in France was 
dominated by tax concerns, which prevented the kind of change seen elsewhere. While the tax 
rule in the other countries was similar to the French rule of recognition without amortization, 
its influence was not as great as in France. France will therefore be examined in a separate 
section (3.3 below). France was to return to a “normal” situation as domestic tax influence 
declined and international influence increased.  
3.2.1. Great Britain (1897 - 1990) 
During this phase, since their immediate negative impacts on income harm dividend 
distribution, the purely static approaches (immediate expensing or rapid amortization against 
the year’s profits) increasingly fell from favour, while a weakened static approach involving 
charging goodwill to equity became more popular. The demise of the immediate expensing or 
rapid amortization practice is visible from the work of influential authors of the first half of 
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th century: Dicksee (1897), Garke and Fells (1922) and Lancaster (1927) all reject the 
practice of quick “writing down” against income. The dominant solution was to make 
goodwill disappear by charging it to equity, a practice that combines the basic static approach 
– goodwill is not an asset – with the possibility of dividend distribution, based on current 
profit. The shareholder model was growing in importance. 
The idea of charging goodwill to equity came from the leading author for the second half of 
the 19
th century, Dicksee (1897). This “king” of British accounting was caught between two 
conflicting views: 
-  influenced by the static doctrine of the time, he accepted that goodwill is an asset of 
“arbitrary” value (1897, p. 45) that can be considered equivalent in nature to 
“Establishment expenses” (1897, p. 46) and must be treated with “the greatest caution” 
(1897, p. 46). He arrived at the conclusion that this asset should be eliminated “with all 
due speed” (1897, p. 45-46); 
-  on the other hand, he also had shareholder’s interests in mind, and believed that goodwill 
“should not be written off out of profits” (1897, p. 46) because that is equivalent to 
creating “a secret reserve” (1897, p. 47). 
Failing to find an optimum solution, Dicksee (1897), in agreement with Tillyard (1920, p. 
106), appears to have finally accepted that acquired goodwill should be charged to reserves, 
particularly if the goodwill was artificially inflated. As in the previous period, many authors 
such as Hamilton (1914, p. 218), Lancaster (1927, p. 146) and Garke and Fells (1922) were 
drawn to this view for practical reasons.  
This weakened static solution remained the standard approach in the UK until the end of 
the 1980s. Apart from reference to the influence of the dominant doctrine, one important fact 
supports this statement: despite an attempt to change the situation (a discussion paper dated 
1980 with a proposal for capitalization and systematic amortization), at no time were the 
British lawmakers in a position to impose a solution contrary to the dominant practice 
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to be written off immediately against reserves while offering an alternative treatment 
consisting of capitalization and amortization against future profits over its “useful economic 
life”. The first treatment was adopted almost universally (Arnold et al., 1994; Peasnell, 1996). 
In our opinion, the weakened static solution is effectively a “convenient” variant of the 
purely static approach. Its aim is not to make goodwill an asset, but to make it disappear 
“softly, softly”. Our view appears to correspond to the position defended in Great Britain 
(Holgate, 1990, p. 11). 
3.2.2. US (1897 - 1970) 
As in Great Britain, the static approach still dominated in the United States during this 
period, the basic view being that goodwill was not a real asset and should be made to 
disappear as soon as possible. However, rather than being charged to expenses, goodwill was 
increasingly charged against equity, and so the weakened static approach began to 
predominate as it did in England. On the theoretical aspect, Dicksee’s ideas were widely 
echoed in the United States, where many authors favoured the solution of an immediate write-
off against retained earnings or capital surplus (Kester, 1922, p. 419; Lincoln, 1923; Mac 
Kinsey & Meech, 1923, p. 538). 
This philosophy was also reflected in the first US regulations. In 1917, a memorandum 
entitled “Uniform Accounting” issued by the American Institute of Accountants (predecessor 
to the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants) was accepted by the Federal Trade 
Commission and Federal Reserve Board, for application by companies wishing to obtain a 
loan. It recommends that goodwill should be “shown as a deduction from net worth” (AIA, 
1917). While this treatment was only compulsory for financial statements produced for the 
purposes of a loan, it still reveals the state of mind at the time. 
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followed by systematic amortization over its useful life or the period referred to for 
discounting to present value (Gilman, 1916, p. 195; Hatfield, 1918, p. 117; Paton & 
Stevenson, 1922, p. 531; Hatfield, 1927; Yang, 1927, p. 196; Paton & Littleton, 1940, p. 92). 
Others were in favour of recognition at cost with no systematic amortization (Dickinson, 
1917, pp. 79-80; Freeman, 1921, p. 263; Bliss, 1924, p. 350; Esquerré, 1927, p. 130).  
A significant event of this period was the serious 1929 economic crisis in American 
industry, which had several consequences in terms of treatment of goodwill. Its main impact 
was to reinforce the positions of those who saw goodwill as an unstable, if not undesirable, 
item (Walker, 1938b, p. 259).  
3.2.3 Germany (1985-2000) 
The main difficulty in analysis of this period lies in the fact that Germany introduced all 
European accounting directives into its national regulations at the same time, and reformed 
regulations governing both individual and consolidated accounts, with different solutions for 
goodwill. This change also coincided with the development of the German capital market. 
a) Individual accounts 
The German law of 1985, which incorporated the fourth EU directive into German 
regulations, includes a paragraph 255 with three sections on the treatment of goodwill in 
individual financial statements: (1) section 1: goodwill may be capitalized if it has been 
acquired; (2) section 2: if goodwill is capitalized, it must be amortized each subsequent year 
by at least 25 per cent; (3) section 3: the amortization may, however, “also be distributed 
systematically over the years which are likely to benefit” (see Ballwieser, 1996).  
A first look at this rather indecisive text can lead to the following conclusions: the law does 
not impose treatment of goodwill as an asset, and allows (as before) immediate expensing of 
the corresponding disbursements. It can be even asserted that the “expense solution” remains 
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if the goodwill is capitalized, rapid amortization must be applied over a period of less than 5 
years. This basic solution is explained, according to the doctrine, by the traditional 
conservatism principle  (Walz, 1999, margin note 82; Duhr, 2003, p. 973; Ellrott, 2003, 
margin note 245). 
But section 3 sheds some doubt on the “soundness” of the basic solution: for the first time 
in the history of Germany, an official text allows treatment of goodwill according to the 
dynamic approach, with capitalization and amortization over its full period of use. 
Unsurprisingly given this ambiguity, which some specialists considered totally illogical 
(Busse von Colbe & Ordelheide, 1993, p. 234; Küting, 2000, p. 102), the German doctrine is 
hesitant as to the nature of goodwill in individual accounts. It seems that the majority of 
German authors (see namely Busse von Colbe, 1986, p. 87; Förschle & Kropp, 1986, p. 155; 
Söffing, 1988, p. 599; Weber & Zündorf, 1989, p. 334; Förschle, 1995, margin note 7; 
Küting, 1997, p. 461; Ludz, 1997, p. 70; Baetge, Kirsch & Thiele, 2002, p. 262) consider that 
neither the text of the law, nor the nature of goodwill (which is neither individually resalable 
nor individually valuable, and represents anticipated benefits) can confer on goodwill the 
status of a true asset. For a good number of these authors, goodwill, if capitalized, is only a 
“balance sheet-help” (“Bilanzierungshilfe”, an item which can in exceptional cases be 
recorded in the balance sheet, although it is not an asset), i.e. (in our own interpretation) a 
fictitious asset to be got rid of as rapidly as possible.  
It can be concluded at this stage that although, from a regulation standpoint, the dynamic 
solution was beginning to break through (an undeniably new development in the German 
context), the basic solution, as confirmed by the predominant doctrine, remained the classic 
static conception. But this view must be cross-checked against the practices allowed for 
consolidated accounts. 
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The treatment of goodwill in consolidated accounts is codified by article 309-1 of the 
German Commercial Code. This article displays two fundamental oddities in comparison with 
its counterpart for individual accounts. 
The first, which necessarily derives from the European text, is that, as a matter of principle, 
goodwill must be (not may be) capitalized (article 309-1, § 1). The different wording initially 
appears to indicate a different treatment compared to individual accounts. But there is a 
second oddity: the fact that the German legislator has used the flexibility of article 30 § 2 of 
the seventh EC directive, which allows member states to authorize companies to write off 
goodwill against equity. Many German authors who recommend unifying the rules between 
corporate and consolidated accounts, notably Busse von Colbe and Ordelheide (1993, p. 233) 
and Küting (1997, p. 455), refer to Niehus (1986, p. 239) in underlining that this flexibility 
results from a request by Great Britain, and constitutes an “error”. Whether or not this is true, 
this “error” has been legalized by the German legislator, who was under no obligation to do 
so. Article 309-1 paragraph 3 allows German groups to write off goodwill against 
consolidated retained earnings (but unlike the seventh directive, without specifying that the 
write-off must be immediate). To complete the scene, the German legislator has integrated 
other solutions allowed for individual accounts into the regulations for consolidated accounts: 
rapid amortization over a maximum of 5 years (paragraph 1) and amortization over the useful 
life (paragraph 2). 
In terms of actual practices, the studies described by Busse von Colbe and Ordelheide 
(1993, p. 234, note 31) and Küting (2000) show that there was a real craze among German 
groups for the weakened static solution.  
All this evidence makes it reasonable to state that due to the decisive importance of 
consolidated accounts, the 1985-2000 period in Germany was mainly dominated by the 
weakened static solution.  
  283.3. Phase 2 in France: the fiscal approach (1917 – 1982) 
From 1917, the tax administration began to intervene on the French accounting scene. Its 
theory of how goodwill should be treated was to have great influence on commercial doctrine 
and regulations. This phenomenon was unique in the four countries studied and lasted more 
than sixty years, from 1917 to 1982. 
a) The new doctrine of the French tax administration for individual accounts 
To begin with, when the first major French law on income taxes (the law of July 31, 1917) 
was enacted, the tax view was not openly hostile to the static approach. Article 4 of the law 
simply stated that taxable profit was the amount after deduction of all expenses, including 
“amortization generally accepted in the practices of each type of industry”. But subsequently, 
no doubt for budgetary reasons (Prospert, 1934, p. 71), the tax administration, in an 
instruction of March 30, 1918, refused all systematic (and a fortiori rapid) amortization of 
goodwill (Brière, 1934, p. 181). Despite some changes between 1918 and 1928, the French 
tax administration’s position remained almost constantly as follows practically from 1928 to 
the modern day: (1) goodwill is an asset (but start-up costs are not); (2) goodwill cannot be 
systematically amortized; (3) goodwill can be reduced in exceptional circumstances. 
b) The influence of the tax administration’s position on French accounting regulations 
Its influence was considerable. As early as 1944, Dalsace (1944, p. 142) was complaining 
about people “giving in” to the tax administration’s ideas and pointed out that “all financial or 
fiscal considerations should be independent of asset valuation and amortization”. A few years 
later, an essay was published entitled “the hijacking of accounting by taxation” (Rives, 1962). 
As regards goodwill, this hijacking was obvious from 1947. From the first French General 
Accounting Plan (Plan comptable général) (CNC, 1947, p. 79-81) it is clear that tax (i.e. 
actuarial) concerns had got the better of static and dynamic approaches: there is no 
(systematic) amortization account for goodwill, merely a provision account (but no indication 
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Accounting Plan was issued (Poujol, 1965, p. 96), and continued until 1982. 
In order to guarantee tax income, the French taxation system acted exactly like a short-
term-oriented investor, obliging firms to maximize their current income to the detriment of 
future earnings. France’s acceptance of the tax administration’s position disallowing 
systematic amortization of goodwill should not be taken to mean that France was more 
“advanced” than other countries; on the contrary, it is the sign of a delay in its development 
towards stock market capitalism.  
c) The case of consolidated accounts 
The above remarks concerned individual accounts. In the case of consolidated accounts, the 
situation in France also displayed a peculiarity compared to the other countries. Up to 1985, 
no strict obligation to establish consolidated accounts applied to French groups. During the 
whole period 1917-1982 the only French regulation that groups wishing to establish 
consolidated accounts could refer to was a CNC (Conseil National de la Comptabilité – 
National Accountancy Council) report published in 1968 (CNC, 1968) and revised in 1978, 
but with no legal enforceability, which proposed that goodwill (at that time called “Prime 
d’acquisition des titres de participation” – “Acquisition premium on long-term investments”) 
should be maintained without change in the consolidated balance sheet (with no systematic 
amortization), “unless special circumstances justify reducing its value by constitution of a 
provision for impairment” (CNC, 1978, § 4102a). This solution visibly remained in line with 
the tax and accounting doctrines prevailing at that time for individual accounts, but as it had 
no legal value, groups were not obliged to follow this framework. 
Some studies, however, seem to show that even in this period, a few French groups were 
beginning to follow the lead of the most “modern” American rules. For instance, Péchiney 
amortized its goodwill over 10 years in 1969 and 40 years in 1973 (Bensadon, 2002, p. 58). It 
  30was thus a time of conflict between what French regulations allowed and what French groups 
wanted. 
3.4. Phase 3: the dynamic phase 
3.4.1. United States: the dynamic position comes out on top (1970 - 2001) 
In the period 1940-1970, three main phenomena were visible on the American scene: the 
doctrine and practice of writing off goodwill was in decline, the dynamic doctrine and 
practice began to take over, and there was still some resistance to doctrines and practices that 
wanted goodwill to have no impact on profit.  
a) The decline of the write-off  
In the doctrine, this decline is clear, at least from around 1945-1970. The leading author of 
accounting literature at the time was the renowned Paton (1962), who like other authors such 
as Walker (1953), Kripke (1961), Hylton (1964; 1966) and Wolff (1967, p. 258), was in 
favour of dynamic approaches and against goodwill write-offs. His opponents were only 
minor authors, often practitioners such as Catlett and Olson (1968), and Spacek (1973).  
The decline is just as obvious in the regulations (AAA, 1948, p. 340; AIA, 1953, p. 39-40). 
The AIA’s basic position was that acquired goodwill should be systematically amortized by 
reduction of current income. But write-offs were still allowed. A decisive attack on this stand 
came in 1966 in the form of APB Opinion No. 9 concerning prior-period adjustments. This 
argued that write-offs should in principle be charged against current income.   
The decline of the write-off was equally strong in practice (Hughes, 1982, p. 156). The 
reasons for the declining popularity of the practice are not clear (see Kripke, 1961, p. 1029, 
note 3; Spacek, 1973), but apparently concern the aim to avoid (1) elimination of reserves that 
were useful for dividend distribution; (2) a sudden impact on reserves and (3) reduction of the 
financial surface of the firm. 
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The move towards the dynamic approach happened slowly. It probably began in the 1930s, 
a period of serious economic depression when businesses tried to reassure shareholders by 
providing a “smoothed” (to apply a modern term) presentation of income. But in a context of 
economic crisis, with conservative approaches still very strong at the time (Kripke, 1961, p. 
1032), it was too early for full application of this “new” doctrine, at least for goodwill. It was 
only in the 1960s and 1970s that the dynamic doctrine came to dominate in treatment of 
goodwill, at a time when stock markets were sluggish, demonstrating that creditor protection 
was no longer a concern of the state (decline of the stakeholder model).  
Although it was not absolute, this domination is clear in both regulations and practices. In 
terms of regulations, the main official document reflecting the domination of dynamic 
practices is APB Opinion No. 17 of 1970, which stipulates that goodwill must be “amortized 
by systematic expenses over a certain period”. This effectively cancelled out the options left 
open by ARB 43 ch. 5, which had favoured write-offs.  
c) Continued opposition  
It is always difficult to satisfy all companies, as they all operate in different conditions. 
APB 17 was adopted by 13 votes for over 5 against, indicating significant “resistance” to the 
dynamic approaches.  
Resistance from the weakened static view 
For some companies, busy around 1970 with massive mergers on a scale the United States 
had never seen before, the prospect of having to amortize enormous amounts of goodwill – 
even over 40 years – was problematic. The regular reduction in income that would result was 
felt to be a less satisfactory solution than a reduction in reserves or equity (Catlett & Olson, 
1968; see also Miller, 1973, p. 280, 291; Colley & Volkan, 1988, p. 41).  
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In parallel to the “doctrinal resistance”, pressure was put on members of the APB, with a 
certain degree of success. The result was a “modern” and “beneficial” version of the static 
solution: pooling of interests. Until 1950, the only business combination method that existed 
was the purchase accounting method (Catlett & Olson, 1968, p. 45). Pooling of interests was 
“discovered” in 1950 with ARB 40 (AIA, 1950), but was not of great interest until 1957 
because the write-off method was neither yet discredited nor prohibited. But starting from 
1957, in a high-inflation context that saw goodwill values shoot up, pooling began to play a 
strategic role for companies who were reluctant to amortize and wished to carry on using 
practices similar to write-offs (Catlett & Olson, 1968, p. 3-4). Throughout this period there 
was great pressure to broaden the criteria for application of the pooling of interests method. 
The struggle was not yet over: in 1969, the APB considered prohibiting pooling in a political 
environment calling for checks on mergers, seen as bad for national employment (Spacek, 
1972). A prominent author like Briloff (1967; 1968; 1979) sharply criticized what he called 
“dirty pooling”. But once again, under pressure from businesses the APB backed down
4.  
In the end, the pooling of interests method could be used by any group undertaking a 
merger by exchange of stock. While this meant that the write-off technique was no longer as 
widely accepted as in the previous period, it remained possible to use it in a particularly 
favourable form (elimination of goodwill with no impact on reserves) for some merger 
transactions.  
                                                 
4 Interestingly, after the adoption of SFAS 141 and 142, Briloff, in an interview, criticized the new rule because 
of the leeway it gives management for determining when goodwill has become impaired. Briloff even stated that 
he had “labored for 30 years to get rid of pooling accounting and [was] sorry [he] did” (interview given to the 
AIMR’s The Financial Journalist E-Newsletter for January 2002 - 
http://www.newswise.com/articles/view/?id=FJJAN.IMR). 
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As Hughes (1982) pointed out, there are few references to the actuarial doctrine in 
publications over the period 1958-1980. Only a few authors, like Knortz (1970), and 
especially May (1943; 1957; quoted in Catlett & Olson, 1968, p. 88-89) and Gynther (1969), 
dared to speak openly in defence of this approach.  
After 1972, the dynamic doctrine took over, but the desire to use the actuarial approach 
remained at the back of the minds of a good many US businesses. This fact is important to 
fully understand the current situation. 
3.4.2. France (1982 – 2005) 
After a period of more than sixty years’ “stagnation” in France, this phase brought sudden 
signs of a clear change in treatment of goodwill, and the dynamic approach became more 
popular. 
The first sign came in the third postwar official General Accounting Plan issued in 1982. 
This reintroduced a goodwill amortization account, and stated that “intangible items making 
up goodwill do not necessarily benefit from legal protection that confers a certain value” 
(CNC, 1982, p. 120). Thus a degree of incentive for amortization for accounting (rather than 
tax) purposes appeared.  
The move towards the dynamic approach was confirmed by the regulations governing 
consolidated accounts. Decree 67-236 on companies, amended following the law of 1985 on 
consolidated financial statements, ruled that unallocated goodwill arising on first 
consolidation “must be included in income over a period of amortization”, while regulation 
99-02, paragraph 21130 of 1999, stated that “the amortization period must… reflect the 
assumptions used and objectives evidenced at the time of acquisition”. 
It is true that even the regulations used the flexibility allowed by the seventh directive, and 
introduced the possibility for French groups to write off goodwill against reserves. But 
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happen “in exceptional circumstances duly justified in the notes” (Decree of March 23, 1967 
modified in 1986, § 248-3). Clearly, the aim was to restrain the use of the weakened static 
approach in favour of the dynamic view. 
The last issue deserving our attention is pooling. At the beginning of the period, the method 
was totally absent from French regulations. It was only in 1999 that the French regulator, not 
wishing to “disadvantage” French groups, decided to introduce this treatment of goodwill into 
French regulations (CRC, 1999, § 215). But pooling was rarely used for two main reasons. 
First, it was allowed as an exception, subject to strict conditions. Second, and probably more 
importantly, it appeared on the French scene not long before the regulator announced plans to 
put an end to its use.  
The final question is why most French companies (with enough influence to achieve 
substantial change in the regulations) wanted to adopt a dynamic approach. The main reason 
for the move towards a dynamic approach was, we believe, a process of imitation: in order to 
build an international reputation, large French companies had to comply with US and/or 
international rules, i.e. rules which at the time favoured the dynamic treatment of goodwill 
(IASC, 1993). The third “French” phase was in fact an international phase dictated by the 
dominant accounting solutions of the worldwide shareholder model (see below).  
3.4.3. Great Britain (1990 – 2005) 
The period from 1990 to the modern day saw the arrival of laws in Britain that either 
recommended or imposed amortization of goodwill. To fully understand this evolution, we 
need to look at what was happening in international standards. In 1990 ED 47 (ASC, 1990) 
recommended systematic amortization of goodwill, but no final draft followed due to fierce 
opposition by businesses (Brown, 1998, p. 61; Paterson, 2002b). In 1993, a discussion paper 
(ASB, 1993) also recommended systematic amortization, and in 1997, FRS 10 (ASB, 1997), 
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20 years the preferred method, although non-amortization with application of an annual 
impairment test was also allowed.  
As company law required goodwill to be amortized, and considered that non-amortization 
was justified only if necessary to provide a true and fair view, and even then subject to 
providing evidence that the goodwill had an indefinite life, it is possible to assert that 
systematic amortization was the basic new rule.  
Overall, in spite of the fact that goodwill was yet not formally recognized as a true asset, 
the rules were clearly leaning towards the dynamic solution. But an alternative approach was 
still allowed as an option. This dualistic stance can be interpreted in two ways: 
-  the most plausible interpretation is that the British standard-setters had to yield to the 
solutions adopted in the United States and the IASC (1993), which favoured systematic 
amortization; 
-  but alternatively, it may indicate that some British businesses were looking to replace the 
write-off practice by another, more favourable approach: non-amortization with 
impairment tests. This would make the issue not write-off versus amortization, but write-
off versus the actuarial approach. 
3.4.4. Germany: the (short) dynamic phase (2000-2005) 
In a context of globalization and the rising power of the American corporate governance 
model, backed by certain international accounting organizations such as the IASB, it is not 
surprising that there were many calls in Germany at the end of the 20
th century to end German 
“peculiarities” and align practices with the dominant American views.  
In 1998, the law “on the facilitation and the reception of capital” (KapAEG) introduced an 
article (292a) in the German Commercial Code allowing German groups (until 2004) to adopt 
IAS and even US GAAP for consolidated accounts, provided these rules were compatible 
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i.e. “Principles of proper accounting” – German GAAP). 
The DSR (Deutscher Standardisierungsrat - German Accounting Standards Board), a new 
body charged by the Ministry of Finance to forge new regulations for consolidated accounts, 
confirmed with its first standard, DRS1 (DSR, 1999), that American rules could be considered 
as equivalent to the GoB. Then in July 2000, the DSR published DRS4 (DSR, 2000) on the 
“acquisitions of companies and group accounts”. This DRS, schematically: (1) imposes 
systematic capitalization of goodwill as an element of the companies’ wealth (DRS 4.1f); (2) 
prohibits all write-offs against equity (DRS 4.27-29); (3) imposes systematic amortization 
(normally straight-line) over the period of use, up to a limit of 20 years (DRS 4.31). An 
impairment loss may be booked in addition to this amortization if the recoverable value is 
lower than the net book value (DRS 4.34). Clearly, as a whole, the DRS espoused the IASC’s 
positions, themselves fundamentally in line with American conceptions at the time. 
In 2001 the American standard-setter published SFAS 142 (FASB, 2001b) which rang the 
death knell for systematic amortization of goodwill, in favour of an actuarial solution 
(impairment based on the estimation of future cash flows). The DSR faced a dilemma: could 
it go on asserting that the new American rules were compatible with European and GoB 
rules? 
Despite the warnings of many of the major actors in German doctrine, such as Busse von 
Colbe (2001, p. 879) and Hommel, (2001, p. 1943), and more broadly the majority of the 
members of the Scientific Committee for Accounting (Wissenschaftliche Kommission 
Rechnungswesen) (according to Siegel, 2002, p. 749), the DSR, after an “animated debate”, 
published DSR1a (DSR, 2002), specifying that the new American doctrine on goodwill did 
not prevent adoption of FASB standards as a substitute for GoB. It also upheld DSR4 as 
before. These decisions sent shockwaves around Germany. Even the most moderate of 
commentators underlined the totally contradictory nature of the two standards, and the 
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(Moxter, 2001, p. 1; Krawitz cited in Siegel, 2002, p. 749; Duhr, 2003, p. 974; Busse von 
Colbe, 2004; Schildbach, 2005, p. 1). The only remaining hope for these numerous objectors 
was the possibility of a veto by the German Ministry of Justice. Unfortunately for them, the 
DSR standard was ratified on April 6, 2002. 
As all this shows, the struggle over goodwill has been played out in very dramatic 
conditions in Germany. Against very strong resistance by the German doctrine to the new 
American position, the defenders of the new international order needed to force a passage for 
the new philosophy of impairment, in anticipation of its ratification by the European Union.  
3.5. Phase 4: the actuarial phase 
The ideal dreamed of by authors like May (1957), who had recommended non-amortization 
of goodwill, came true for the first time independently of any tax considerations in the United 
States at the end of the second half of the 20
th century. 
3.5.1. US (2001 - Nowadays) 
The adoption of an actuarial conception of accounting in the US goes back to the Concept 
Statements (CS) No. 5 (FASB, 1984) and 6 (FASB, 1985). But its application took time. Only 
after more than 20 years did the revolution actually happen, with the adoption of SFAS 141 
and 142 (FASB, 2001a, 2001b) to supersede APB Opinion No. 16 and 17 (AICPA, 1970a, 
1970b), a major event in the United States. Under these new standards, goodwill, whether 
acquired individually or in a business combination, will no longer be amortized but submitted 
to an impairment test, by comparing the fair value of reporting unit goodwill with the carrying 
amount of that goodwill (FASB, 2001b, § 20). These new standards represent a victory for the 
actuarial approach: goodwill is an asset whose value depends on future factors.  
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As this article was being written, another important event took place: the adoption in March 
2004 of standard IFRS 3 (IASB, 2004b) which replaces IAS 22 (IASC, 1993), and the revised 
standard IAS 38 (IASB, 2004a). IFRS 3 requires goodwill acquired individually or in a 
business combination to be recognized as an asset, prohibits amortization of goodwill 
acquired and instead requires the goodwill to be tested for impairment annually. As the IASB 
explicitly states (2004b, § IN3), “it would be advantageous for international standards to 
converge with those of Australia and North America”. 
Since all listed EU companies have been obliged to prepare their consolidated financial 
statements under International Accounting Standards/International Financial Reporting 
Standards from 2005 onwards (European Union, 2002), the three other countries in our study, 
Great Britain, Germany and France entered the actuarial phase in 2005, at least for the 
consolidated financial statements of listed companies. 
4.  Discussion 
4.1. The reasons for the new solution 
The actuarial solution has been seen by some authors as an “optimal” solution in that it 
enables a business to manage results better (Kleindiek, 2001, p. 2576; Küting & Reuter, 2005) 
and, at macroeconomic level during the life of the firm, to increase the mass of assets without 
diminishing the mass of results, by postponing recognition of impairment to the last moment 
when companies are in a state of bankruptcy (see Paterson, 2002a, for a similar view). For a 
short-term oriented manager or shareholder, this actuarial view is much “better” than the pure 
static view, which leads to massive losses at the beginning of the investment cycle, “better” 
than the weakened static view, which produces a decrease in equity and so weakens firms’ 
leverage, and even “better” than the dynamic view, which reduces earnings all along the cycle 
(Richard, 2004a, 2004b). 
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reserves” (Johnson & Petrone, 2001, p. 101) which was problematic in a context where firms 
seek to display their “strength” to their shareholders. It also had a very bad reputation and 
prevented comparability of results (Johnson & Yokley, 1997; FASB, 1998, 1999; Johnson, 
1999, p. 80). The new actuarial solution was seen as “optimal” in the sense that it offered 
nearly all the “advantages” of pooling, without its “disadvantages”. 
It is interesting to note that the actuarial approach was generally judged a good solution by 
the “elites” of the countries studied at the time (see below). 
4.2. US 
Why was the US the first to refuse the static solution (pure or weakened), first adopting the 
dynamic solution then switching to the actuarial approach, and why did it take the other 
countries so long to choose the dynamic and actuarial solutions?  
As far as the US is concerned, our study is in line with recent research by economists, 
especially Lazonick and Sullivan (LS in the rest of the paper) (2000) and Aglietta and 
Rébérioux (AR in the rest of the paper) (2004). These authors have shown that “corporate 
governance for most US corporations, from their emergence in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century through the 1970s, was based on the strategy of retain and reinvest” (LS, p. 
24). They have also shown that throughout this period, the pressure of professional stock 
market investors was very low (LS, p. 31) and that “top managers tended to be integrated with 
the business organizations that employed them” (LS, p. 24) which means that the power was 
generally in the hands of block shareholders and banks (stakeholder model). Our study shows 
that this retain-and-reinvest strategy was nevertheless in decline as the accounting system 
moved from a pure static to a dynamic stance. The reason for this decline is presumably 
linked to the “conglomeration mania” and “massive expansion of corporations that had 
occurred during the 1960s” that “resulted in poor performance” and “huge debt burdens” in 
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to switch their accounting system to a dynamic solution. 
Due to international competition, the American economy turned towards a more financial 
approach with a focus on short-term gains (LS, p. 15-16). There was progressive deregulation 
of the banking sector in favour of savings and loans institutions (LS, p. 17), and rapid 
development in pension and mutual funds. This rise in the importance of professional 
shareholders was accompanied by a fall in the strength of trade unions, as job tenure 
diminished (LS, p. 19-21). All these converging factors explain why the power went to short-
term oriented professional shareholders, and why there was a strong trend towards maximum 
short-term profits, with distribution of massive dividends evidenced by the rising pay-out 
ratios in the 1980s and 1990s (LS, p. 22, AR, p. 83). It is no wonder that abandoning the 
dynamic solution for the actuarial solution was the natural consequence of this evolution. 
In the course of this development, managers disappeared from the scene. Their role in the 
power game is, of course, contested. According to the famous Berle and Means thesis (1932), 
in most large American companies, managers achieved power due to the dispersion of shares. 
This theory has also been used as one of the pillars of the agency theory, whose main purpose 
is to find a way to solve the fundamental conflict between managers and shareholders (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). But the Berle and Means thesis has been challenged by Zeitlin (1974) and 
many other authors. This kind of position has been taken up recently by Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan, who point out that contrary to those who have argued “often without justification, 
that the managers who control the allocation of corporate resources and returns are self-
serving in the exercise of this control”, “shareholders and [our emphasis] top managers have 
certainly benefited under the rule of shareholder value” (2000, p. 27).  
As far as accounting for goodwill is concerned, it is difficult to find any expression in the 
American literature of top management opposition to the concealment of systematic 
amortization of goodwill. Globally speaking it seems, as one leading American economist 
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power, i.e. the professional shareholders. 
The actuarial method adopted in the US also offers an interesting example, supporting the 
theory developed by Robson (1993) on the gap between the outcomes of accounting 
regulation and the calculations of actors involved in the process. The major selling point of 
non-amortization and impairment testing of goodwill is that it should provide accounting 
numbers closer to the true market value, and therefore more useful to investors. However, 
“while goodwill impairment must be regularly assessed, the actual application of SFAS 142 
results in recognizing goodwill created by the reporting entity subsequent to the purchase 
combination, to the extent that this replaces or offsets impaired goodwill, so in many cases 
impairments will not be recognized even when the value of the acquired operations has 
declined. This approach which reverses the longstanding ban on recognizing created (as 
opposed to purchased) goodwill was necessitated by the virtual impossibility of separately 
identifying elements of goodwill having alternative derivations. Even with this simplifying 
approach, measurement of goodwill impairment is a fairly difficult task, often requiring the 
services of independent valuation consultants” (Delaney, Nach, Epstein & Budak, 2003, p. 
427). Given that fair values are not readily available for many of the reporting units to which 
goodwill balances were assigned, managers enjoy a certain amount of discretion when 
applying this standard (Bens, 2006). Beatty and Weber (2006) show empirically that in the 
adoption of SFAS 142, firms’ equity market concerns affect their preference for above-the-
line vs. below-the-line accounting treatment of goodwill, and firms’ debt contracting, bonus, 
turnover, and exchange delisting incentives affect their decisions to accelerate or delay 
expense recognition. 
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To continental European actors, Great Britain is often associated with the idea of stock 
market domination and dispersed shareholders, like the US, possibly to an even greater 
degree. But this is a false picture. Historians of British business have shown that financial 
capital and especially stock market capital only began to play a leading role for the majority 
of large British firms in the 1970s (Wilson, 1995, p. 193), and that “the shareholder pre-
eminence achieved in the 1980s and 1990s, far from being a normal state of affairs, is an 
anomaly” (Davies, 2002, quoted by Armour, Deakin & Konzelmann, 2003, p. 2). Before that 
period, the family firm directed by “gentlemen” (i.e. owner-managers) was the dominant 
feature of the British economy (Coleman, 1987, p. 8; Gourvish, 1987, p. 33-34; Wilson, 1995, 
p. 155). It is therefore unsurprising that until that time, self-generated capital was still the 
most popular means of funding investments (Hannah, 1983, p. 62; Wilson, 1995, p. 129-130). 
If we add that British banks went on pursuing a conservative strategy, it is easy to understand 
why the traditional weakened static solution initiated by Dicksee (1897) could have been so 
successful for so long: it guaranteed satisfaction for both self-financing family owners and 
prudent bankers alike. This de facto alliance between creditors and long-term investors was 
particularly acute during the inter-war years, as stressed by Edwards (1989, p. 138) and 
Maltby (2000), but has had very long-term consequences for goodwill. Of course from the 
1970s, with the growing importance of financial capital, the British economy became a kind 
of dualistic economy, with the persistence of the traditional family firm on one hand, and the 
rise of international giants financed by external capital on the other. This explains why, when 
discussion of SSAP 22 was going on in the early 1980s, there was a clash between proponents 
of the weakened static view and tenants of the dynamic approach. With the era of takeover 
bids (the second half of the 1980s) and the need to inflate balance sheets in order to ward off 
predators, the static solution became more and more problematic for many British giants. 
This, plus the influence of the dominant international solutions of the time, may well explain 
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p. 22) underline, the provisions of European Community Directives could be “a major 
countervailing force to shareholder primacy”, the fact is that in 2002 a significant majority 
(74%) of British CFOs stated that companies were eager to apply IAS before 2005, 
presumably because Great Britain has a strong capital market (Holgate & Gaul, 2002).  
4.4. Germany 
Germany is the country where the pure or weakened static solutions have taken the longest 
to disappear. This is not surprising: until quite recently, say the mid-1990s, the environment 
was very hostile to shareholder value. Only after that period were there signs that a change 
might be welcome. As is well known, the traditional German system of governance is based 
on three pillars (Jürgens, Naumann & Rupp, 2000, p. 59): the banks, co-determination and 
company-centred management. 
Up to 1998 the role of the stock market and private pension funds in German companies’ 
financing was marginal (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1995, p. 25, cited in Jürgens, Naumann & 
Rupp, 2000, p. 62). The power was largely in the hands of the big German families and the 
banks, but under pressure from employee representatives. These three groups, the basis of the 
stakeholder model, form the traditional “governing coalition” (Hackethal, Schmidt & Tyrell, 
2003). In 1992 the banks held no less than 61% of the voting rights of the top 100 listed 
companies by virtue of proxy votes (Baums & Fraune, 1995, p. 103). The influence of 
employee representatives, although variable, was quite important in a majority of supervisory 
boards (Gerum, 1991). In this context, the problem was not how to create value in the short-
term and distribute dividends, but how to be self-financing, reimburse bank loans and 
guarantee the stability of the workforce in the long-term. Even German managers, trained as 
technical rather than financial engineers (Eberwein & Tholen, 1990), were party to the 
consensus in favour of accumulation of wealth. No wonder that in these conditions, 
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retaining income for the sake of creditors and their allies, the managers. This fundamental 
characteristic has been demonstrated by German authors (Barth, 1953; Döllerer, 1971; Beisse, 
1993; Schön, 1997; Moxter, 1998; Weber-Grellet, 1999) as well as French authors (Richard, 
2002a).  
But in the middle of the 1990s things began to change. A series of inquiries (Förschle, 
Glaum & Mandler, 1998) showed that, in a context of market globaliation and the need (partly 
resulting from German reunification) to find new ways of financing on the Anglo-American 
stock markets, some top managers in Germany’s largest and most internationalized listed 
companies began to see corporate development along the lines of the model recommended by 
American consultants and academics, serving shareholder value (see also the examples given 
by Jürgens, Naumann & Rupp, 2000, p. 74). Presumably under this influence, the government 
issued a series of regulations designed to develop a more “Anglo-Saxon” type of 
management: creation of a “German SEC” (1995) which merged in 2001 with the German 
Financial Services Authority, abolition of capital gains tax (1998), authorization for the 
creation of private pension funds (1998), creation of the “new stock market” (1997), abolition 
of multiple voting rights and restrictions on banks concerning the use of proxy votes and 
cross-shareholdings (1998), introduction of a mandatory bidding procedure in the new 
takeover law of 2001, and creation of a new private body for the promotion of international 
accounting standards.  
All these measures, particularly the related rapid development of private pension funds 
guided by shareholder value principles, significantly changed the landscape and style of 
management among the elite major listed companies and banks (Jürgens, Naumann & Rupp, 
2000, p. 71). This extremely fast-paced change may explain why listed German groups were 
allowed to opt for international or even American accounting principles from 1998, and why 
Brussels encountered no German opposition to adoption of the new international rules 
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1998 on the “Raising of Equity Relief - Kapitalaufnahme-Erleichterungsgesetz” and Kontrag, 
as described by German authors (Böcking & Orth, 1998; Claussen, 1998; 1999; Hommelhoff 
et al., 1999; Haller & Eierle, 2004), and analyzed by Richard (2002c; 2002b), have 
encouraged a clear trend towards US management criteria for major German companies. 
4.5. France 
Like Britain, the case of France may appear surprising. In spite of its traditional reputation 
as state and family-driven (the famous “cent familles” said to control the country), France 
adopted a dynamic treatment for goodwill (as far as consolidated accounts are concerned) 
sooner than Germany and even Britain. The explanation is relatively simple. As shown by 
French economists, notably by Morin (2000, p. 41-42), on the basis of documentation 
provided by the Banque de France, France is a country where the influence of foreign 
(especially what the French call “Anglo-Saxon”) investors is very high. By 1985, the share of 
foreign ownership on the various French stock exchanges had reached 10%; and it grew to 
35% in 1997. Over that period, probably in line with this shift of power on the stock market, 
the traditional “cross-shareholding” model was disintegrating, especially after 1996 (Morin, 
2000, p. 38). The growing influence of foreign investors, notably the North American pension 
funds, has driven a new style of management oriented towards shareholder value. During the 
last ten years, the average duration of shareholding by large investors in French listed firms 
has decreased from seven years to seven months (de Kerdrel, 2006). Morin (2000, p. 45), after 
interviews held in 1998 with managers of leading French companies, says he “has been able 
to verify that this diktat regarding norms is being observed throughout the CAC 40 index 
companies”. He adds (p. 49) that “many directors admit that it is impossible to escape the 
demands made by the US and British investors”, which confirms our hypothesis of a link 
between management and professional shareholders. This evolution in French capitalism from 
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Colasse and Standish (1998) have shown how membership of the CNC (Conseil National de 
la Comptabilité – National Accountancy Council), the accounting regulatory body, has 
rapidly evolved in the nineties in favour of representatives of large (listed) enterprises and 
audit companies, to the detriment of the public sector. All these factors explain why French 
accounting legislation on goodwill has, at least since 1985, followed American or 
international standards. 
4.6. Impact of accounting for goodwill on the shareholder model and the economy 
At the beginning of the article we mentioned the existence of a reverse link between 
accounting for goodwill and the social and economic environment. The impact of various 
interest groups on goodwill treatment has been demonstrated throughout, and some attention 
should now be given to this reverse link.  
Even Briloff, a major opponent to pooling of interests as already mentioned, cites one 
argument often put forward in support of the method: “many business combinations would 
not have been consummated if ‘pooling accounting’ were proscribed” (Briloff & Engler, 
1979). The implication is clear: the accounting technique has a direct impact on the economy 
through the realization of the transaction. 
In a report, Plihon (2002) states that the weight of goodwill, compared to equity, is 
extremely important because of the very high-value acquisitions of the 1990s. Consequently, 
he anticipates that goodwill amortization will negatively impact prospects for future profits 
and profitability in the medium term, which could lead to a rise in the level of debt and 
consequently generate a risk of insolvency and illiquidity.  
Plihon’s report was written before France’s adoption of IFRS. Taking the move to IFRS 
into account, Boukari and Richard (2006, p. 84, 88) find on a sample of 146 large French 
listed firms that the adoption of IFRS in 2005 resulted in a 42% increase in 2004 net income 
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5). More interestingly, 60% of 
the increase in net income can be attributed to cancellation of goodwill amortization in favour 
of impairment. This situation, which can reasonably be expected in other countries switching 
from goodwill amortization to impairment, provides evidence of the impact of the change in 
accounting standards on net income, which, in turn favours shareholders.  
Combining these two examples, the following assumption can reasonably be reached: 
beyond the improvement of profit through impairment, the change in accounting regulations 
for goodwill was also intended to have an economic impact: facilitation of mergers and 
acquisitions.  
Although we can provide no direct evidence for this, we can quote Brown-Humes (2006), 
who observes a “record amount of mergers and acquisitions in Europe” in 2006, explaining 
that two key trends encourage M&A activity: debt is cheap and “corporate balance sheets are 
healthy”. Regarding this second reason, it can safely be assumed that the replacement of 
goodwill amortization by an impairment test will lead to “healthier” balance sheets, as the 
reported goodwill will not reduce future equity (as long as a material impairment is not 
recorded).  
Given that the shareholder model “lives on” business combinations, this accounting 
technique, in facilitating business combination transactions, fosters the trend towards the 
shareholder model.  
5.  Conclusion, limitations and directions for future research 
This article sets out to study the evolution of accounting for goodwill in four countries, 
Great Britain, the United States, Germany and France, over a period of more than one century. 
We show that at the outset these four countries were in an identical position, with a static 
                                                 
5 This comparison was possible because all French listed firms were required to publish a comparative table 
showing the net income for the previous year (i.e. 2004) computed under both sets of standards: IFRS and 
French GAAP. 
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common phase using the actuarial approach (recognition and impairment testing). 
Interestingly, the actuarial view, which is in the process of becoming the dominant practice, 
was already in existence in the 1900s. 
We have attempted to explain this evolution with reference to the stakeholder and 
shareholder models. While the stakeholder model was the most dominant at the start of the 
period covered by our study, the shareholder model is clearly the most influential in our own 
time. The US model was therefore the first to feel the need to change the old system 
(expensing or charging to reserves), and subsequently the first to adopt amortization, then 
impairment testing. In the stakeholder model, owners are more concerned for the firm’s long-
term viability due to their active involvement in management, their understanding of the 
firm’s future prospects and the relative difficulty of exits. In the shareholder model, 
shareholder-owners have lost patience and even interest in the nuts and bolts of the firm’s 
actual business and are demanding faster and bigger financial returns. We show that there has 
been an evolution in accounting regulations on goodwill in the four countries studied towards 
the actuarial phase, which is totally different from the initial phase, the static approach. 
We are of course aware that several issues and problems remain and deserve more in-depth 
analysis and discussion: (1) The alternative theories that could explain the evolution of 
accounting treatments for goodwill, especially the recent international harmonization of 
practices; (2) the choice of the four countries studied and the general nature of our analyses; 
and (3) the suitability of our theory for explaining other accounting changes. 
First, as noted earlier, the ‘stakeholder vs. shareholder’ question is a standard theme in 
finance and corporate governance literature. However, the long-term vs. short-term 
orientation may not be the only attribute differentiating these two models. Because of their 
active involvement in management and greater access to information, owners in the 
stakeholder model do not need to rely solely on public financial accounting information for 
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relevant financial reporting based on historical cost. Conversely, investors in the shareholder 
model use mainly publicly available accounting information for their decision-making and so 
their demand for timely, “actuarial” disclosure is very high.  
The international politics of accounting is also very helpful in understanding why France 
and Germany (and to a lesser extent, the UK) followed the US on the matter of accounting 
treatments of goodwill. Examining the interconnections between international politics and 
accounting professionalization projects at local level in Greece, Caramanis (2002) shows 
“how intertwined accountancy and the broader socio-economic and political domain are, not 
only at the local, but also at the international level”. Hirst and Thompson (1995) have 
emphasized the role of politics in the ‘globalization’ era, with particular reference to the 
international accounting profession. They write that “major states may play a pivotal role, 
while the authority and sovereignty of lesser states may be continuously challenged and 
negotiated in a realist fashion” (p. 408). Their analysis can easily be applied to the adoption of 
IAS/IFRS (and therefore the actuarial phase of goodwill treatment) in Europe. 
Second, the choice of the four countries in our survey is open to some debate. As explained, 
they were chosen because they represent the Western world, but we willingly acknowledge 
that other countries could validly be added to the sample. As an example of a possible future 
expansion on this article, we present in Appendix 1 the results of a preliminary investigation 
into a major Asian country, Japan, showing that Japan has reached the dynamic phase but is 
reluctant to adopt the actuarial phase. Despite this reluctance, it can reasonably be assumed 
given the current trend towards IFRS that Japan will also converge to the actuarial approach. 
China could be another interesting example. Its capital market, founded at the beginning of 
the 1990s, now lists more than 1,400 companies. Most of these companies are still clearly 
operating under the stakeholder model: a large portion of their shares (around 60% on 
average) is held by the State, other State-owned firms or families (Ding, Zhang & Zhang, 
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2005, the State-owned shares in most listed companies became tradable. About 200 mutual 
funds are now operating in China and foreign investment funds are also allowed to enter, 
subject to approval. Also, since 2006 stock option incentive plans have begun to spread in 
Chinese firms. To accompany all these developments China began a major accounting 
harmonization move on January 1, 2007, adopting accounting standards very close to 
IAS/IFRS, including the actuarial approach for goodwill treatment, and capitalization of 
development costs. In this context, the adoption of the actuarial approach is certainly an 
advantage for short-term oriented investors. 
In Japan and China, the international politics of accounting may provide an enlightening 
analytical framework. These countries, like many others, are having to accept the new rules of 
the accounting “world game”, because not joining in endangers their participation in the 
world economy. But the shareholder model remains important in a context of international 
politics, for two reasons: “contagion” and “acceptance”. “Contagion”, as the word suggests, 
means that a new type of accounting can only be explained by the emergence of shareholder 
power in the “key” countries that “set” the rules of worldwide accounting governance. The 
source of all change is, in our opinion, linked to the history of these key countries. 
Meanwhile, “acceptance” - willing or under duress - in countries still marked by the 
stakeholder model of the new game rules that favour shareholder interests can only come 
about if the country’s political power is not fundamentally opposed to shareholder interests.  
Finally, another interesting area for exploration would be a search for other balance sheet 
items that may be facing the same changes as goodwill. As shown by Richard (2005c), France 
has seen an evolution from the “static” to the “dynamic” phase for most assets. While the 
actuarial phase may not yet concern tangible fixed assets and most intangible assets, the 
actuarial value “germ” may well be progressively spreading through the structure proposed by 
the IASB, particularly as the principle of systematic amortization of intangible assets has been 
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we have some examples apparently indicating that goodwill cannot be an isolated case: these 
examples concern long-term investments, development costs and environmental expenses.  
The case of long-term investments is particularly interesting. In around 1900, there appears 
to have been no specific treatment for such items, which were accounted for statically in the 
same way as short-term investments, with adjustment for changes in their market value 
(although for reasons of conservatism, often only downward changes were recorded). Then 
during the 20
th century the dynamic view emerged, with a move to differentiation between 
long-term investments and short-term investments, suggesting that only long-term 
investments should be valued by the cost method or the equity method, or that market 
fluctuations that are “other than temporary” should be eliminated. Another frontier was 
crossed with the arrival of IFRS (see IAS 39, IASB, 2003): for certain items, e.g. financial 
assets designated at fair value through profit or loss, valuation based on an actuarial method 
was allowed.  
The treatment of development costs also reveals the same trends as those identified in our 
historical discussion (see Richard, 2004a). In around 1900, the normal accounting method for 
these costs was immediate expensing (the static view). Then, throughout the 20
th century, 
people argued for capitalization followed by amortization (Richard, 2005c, p. 105), and this 
dynamic solution was the approach selected by the IAS (see IAS 38, IASB, 2004a), after its 
initial acceptance for certain restricted situations (in some countries, for example, 
capitalization was limited to exploration costs only). Actuarial valuation of these expenses 
may (still?) be a problem, but it can be considered that the new conception of goodwill is 
encouraging an actuarial approach to treatment of intangibles.   
Finally, the treatment of environmental expenses is a recent issue, and was unknown at the 
start of the 20
th century. This makes historical comparison impossible, but a theoretical 
comparison can be sketched out. Taking the case of dismantling costs for a nuclear power 
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th century lawyers in favour of the static approach would 
clearly not have approved of capitalizing such expenses, as they relate to a fictitious asset 
with no liquidation value. And yet this was the approach later taken by IFRS and many of 
today’s laws. Environmental expenses are capitalized and amortized over a certain period in a 
standard dynamic approach – and some regulations go further and recommend discounting. 
This vision, which has attracted severe criticism from proponents of an ecological view that 
objects to decreasing ecological liabilities to the detriment of future generations, reflects how 
far actuarial reasoning has penetrated.  
We must not allow ourselves to be misled by these examples. There are several others that 
illustrate opposite trends, precisely because of the multiplicity of influences that can operate 
simultaneously. In France, for example, now IFRS have been adopted, it is no longer possible 
to amortize advertising or training costs, and this is a “step backwards” compared to the 
principles of the dynamic accounting view. The internationalization of accounting can visibly 
bring certain independent trends in individual countries to an end, but may also be explained 
in the context of a broader view. 
To conclude, meticulous historical and geographic research into the changes in treatment of 
the main types of asset and liability is necessary to determine whether the theories in this 
article are of general relevance. We believe that its essential merit is to raise the question of 
the meaning of accounting capitalism, and offer “old” European accounting theories as an 
“archetype” (to borrow the term used by Roberts, 1995) to settle the fundamental question of 
the classification and evolution of accounting systems. 
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The static phase (1967 - 1997) 
Group financial reporting is a relatively recent development in Japan compared with the 
United Kingdom and United States. “Financial reporting in Japan has traditionally 
emphasized parent company financial statements rather than consolidated financial 
statements” (Nobes & Parker, 2006, p. 256). Very little has been written on the Japanese 
treatment of goodwill. “The AICPA summary of Japanese accounting (1987) notes that inter-
corporate purchases are rare in Japan” (Dunne & Rollins, 1992, p. 196). 
The rules relating to non-consolidation goodwill and consolidation goodwill are to be found 
in quite separate sources of authority. The non-consolidation goodwill rules (which are 
relevant for tax deductibility purposes) come from the Commercial Code, whereas 
consolidation goodwill is regulated by the Securities and Exchange Law and the Business 
Accounting Deliberation Council (Cooke & Kikuya, 1992).  
In March 1965, after an accounting scandal involving the use of transactions between 
subsidiaries to manipulate earnings, the necessity of mandatory consolidated financial 
statements was recognized. The government requested the Business Accounting Deliberation 
Council to study requirements for consolidated financial statements. In May 1967, the official 
report “Opinion on Consolidated Financial Statements” was issued (BADC, 1967). This 
report was not an officially endorsed accounting standard. On June 24, 1975, the Business 
Accounting Deliberation Council issued its final opinion “Accounting Principles for 
Consolidated Financial Statements” (BADC, 1975) which was endorsed the same day by the 
Ministry of Finance (Ballon, Tomita & Usami, 1976). 
Purchased goodwill (non-consolidation goodwill) (called Noren or Eigyoken), but not 
consolidation goodwill, is deductible for tax purposes over a period of five years or less 
(Walton, Haller & Raffournier, 2003, p. 191).  
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the term used to refer to goodwill in Japan] can be amortized for certain periods in the 
consolidated financial statements. If it is of a small amount, it can be charged in the income 
statement of that period”. There is no specified amortization period. It should not however be 
forgotten that the 1967 report was merely an opinion, and had no legal backing.  
The 1975 Opinion, which is the first endorsed accounting standard on consolidation, 
requires that goodwill arising on consolidation must be amortized by not less than the average 
annual amount over its estimated useful life, with no maximum period specified. However, 
the Commercial Code provides that [non-consolidation] goodwill shall be amortized by not 
less than the average annual amount within five years after the acquisition. In practice, 
therefore, [consolidation] goodwill is amortized within five years or written off immediately 
in the profit and loss account, in accordance with the requirements of the Commercial Code 
(Nobes, 1991, p. 64; Cooke & Kikuya, 1992, p. 210; Lee & Choi, 1992, p. 222; Cooke, 1993, 
p. 465; Nobes, 1993, p. 50; Nobes & Norton, 1996, p. 183, table 2, p. 184, table 3; Sakurai, 
1996, p. 485; Nobes & Norton, 1997, p. 139). 
No weakened static phase 
This phase is identifiable in all the countries except France, as mentioned earlier, and Japan. 
The Japanese situation can probably be explained by the relatively late arrival of regulations 
on goodwill. When the 1967 and 1975 texts were published, it was necessary to educate 
companies, and amortization over a short period appeared the most “reasonable” solution, 
particularly as it was in line with the treatment applicable for non-consolidation goodwill. 
The dynamic phase (1997-Nowadays) 
An amendment to the consolidation policy and procedures (BADC 1975 Opinion) was 
released in 1997 and became effective from fiscal years beginning on or after April 1, 1999. 
Major changes for business combinations resulting from acquisitions include the following: 
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combinations has been extended from five years to the maximum of 20 years (Walton, Haller 
& Raffournier, 2003, pp. 191-192). Japanese companies had complained that this five–year 
period fell far short of the 40 years allowed for US companies, and could be an obstacle to 
their M&A strategies. The new Japanese regulation corresponds to the period specified in the 
IASC standards. 
The BADC also issued a Statement of Opinion, “Accounting for Business Combinations”, 
on October 31, 2003. This standard, which does not replace the 1975 Opinion, as it deals with 
purchased (non-consolidation) goodwill, states that goodwill is to be systematically amortized 
over 20 years or less, and must also be subject to an impairment test. The standard is effective 
for fiscal years beginning on or after April 1, 2006. By issuing this text, the BADC has 
aligned the treatment of non-consolidated accounts and consolidated financial statements.  
Resistance to the actuarial view 
Japan can be considered as a “recalcitrant” country. In a letter sent to the IASB dated 
November 2, 2001, the Chairman of the ASBJ (Accounting Standards Board of Japan) wrote 
the following: “We are opposed to non-amortization of goodwill (…) and we believe that 
goodwill should be amortized within a certain period and be subject to impairment when 
necessary”
6. On April 2, 2003, The Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants sent a 
comment letter to the IASB on ED 3, taking a position similar to that expressed by the ASBJ 
in 2001
7. 
In a release published in January 2006, the ASBJ stated that “as a new Japanese standard on 
business combinations will become effective in 2006, the ASBJ will make at least a tentative 
                                                 
6 This letter can be found on the ASBJ website (http://www.asbj.or.jp). 
7 This letter can be found at the following address: http://www.jicpa.or.jp/n_eng/e20030402.pdf. 
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and new developments discussed by the IASB and the FASB”
8.  
There are several explanations for Japan’s “resistance” to the actuarial view. First, Japanese 
accounting came late to the practice of consolidated accounts. Second, the ASBJ declared in 
2001: “We consider that IASB’s intention to set up the accounting standard for goodwill by 
uncritical reference to the new standard in the United States is too hasty. This new standard 
has only just been issued in July 2001 and, in particular, the appropriateness of non-
amortization approach and validity of impairment tests have not yet been verified at all. The 
IFRS, as an internationally accepted accounting standard, should be carefully established with 
discretion and we believe that verification of the effectiveness of the new US standard is 
necessary even if we are merely referring to it”
9. This statement indicates a certain reluctance 
to apply a rule without attentive examination and analysis. Third, the stakeholder model is 
much stronger in Japan than the four countries in our main study. “At the end of World War 
II, Japan was confronted with the enormous task of rebuilding its war-torn economy. With a 
limited equity market and savings destroyed, government-supported debt financing was the 
only available source of funds. Encouraged by the government and financed by the Bank of 
Japan, new enterprise groupings were formed around Japan’s major commercial banks. These 
new Keiretsu replaced the former Zaibatsu, huge pre-war conglomerates, as the major engines 
of Japan’s post-war economic expansion and the ones most likely to need access to the US 
securities market. Interdependence was fostered among Keiretsu group companies through 
financial, commercial, and personal ties. Under such arrangements, the relationships between 
the borrowing company, related companies, and their bank were very close. Cross 
shareholdings between borrower, related companies, and the bank were common” (Choi et al., 
1983). 
                                                 
8 This release can be found at the following address: www.iasplus.com. 
9 Source: ASBJ website (http://www.asbj.or.jp). 
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anxiety over individual “loss of face”, there has traditionally been a Japanese aversion to 
individualized financial performance-by-results appraisal and reward systems (Hopper, Koga 
& Goto, 1999, p. 76) and accordingly Japanese accounting for goodwill is more influenced by 
the interests of long-term-oriented stakeholders. This is confirmed by Suzuki (2007) who 
develops the idea that accounting can do much more than simply promote transparency and 
comparability of companies for the sake of shareholders and investors, having in mind the 
accounting’s impacts on local economies and societies. 
Meanwhile, as noted by Hopper et al. (1999, p. 80-81), the Japanese economic and business 
world has been changing as a consequence of financial crises. “Since the banks are struggling 
with bad loans, companies that previously relied upon banks for funding are now forced into 
self-financing or must go directly to financial markets [our emphasis]”. In this new 
institutional context, we can reasonably expect that sooner or later, Japan will also enter the 
actuarial phase for its accounting regulations on goodwill. 
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  67Figure 2 – Summary: Stakeholder/shareholder models, balance sheet theory and 






























































  68Figure 3 – Summary: The four phases of accounting treatment of goodwill 
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